Climate Change and Culpable Ignorance: The Case of Pseudoscience

Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them.