On the Normative Complexity of Covid‑19 Vaccine Refusal

In this paper, we aim to provide an adequate normative analysis of the phenomenon of Covid-19 vaccine refusal. We argue that all vaccine-refusers make a moral mistake on the double grounds that the act of refusing to get vaccinated is a free-riding action and a negligent one. We then introduce four archetypes of vaccine refusers in order to further explore under what conditions this moral mistake makes one blameworthy. We maintain that there are both epistemic and motivational considerations that make a difference to one’s blameworthiness for their vaccine refusal and offer some preliminary claims about which epistemic errors and which motivational errors can, in fact, ground blameworthiness. We conclude the paper with some remarks on the complicated connection between blameworthiness and blame, and on why we think the aim of normative analysis should not be to dole out blame.