Realism and Naturalisation in a Practical Reason Account

The paper contends that moral realism entails the mind-independent truth of some moral judgements; but that the mind-independence of "moral facts" is only partly analogous to the mind-independence of physical facts. It is also argued that characteristic moral facts are those relative to the character and dispositions of persons, which supervene on psychological facts. Along with these evaluative facts there are also deontic facts, concerning the reasons for or against embarking on some course of action; these are based on natural facts concerning human beings and the effects of certain actions on their well-being and dispositions. These facts about human beings are not immediately moral facts, but necessarily assume a moral significance for any rational individual reflecting on them. So, there are objective reasons for action, as contended by moral realism, even though actual obligation presupposes the reflective endorsement of these objective reasons into our subjective system of intentions. Finally, some standard objections are discussed to this moderate realistic account