Another argument for Cognitive phenomenology

In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cogni-tive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenom-enology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also in-tended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine meta-physical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his own argument dis-plays that possibility. We present our argument in two steps. First, we attempt to prove that there is a cognitive phenomenology that is irreducible to any form of sensory phenomenology. Our proof relies on a kind of phenomenal contrast argument that however does not appeal to introspection. Second, by show-ing that the link between this form of cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of having thoughts, and sensory phenomenology in general is extrinsic, we also aim to demonstrate that the former is inde-pendent of the latter.