Theoretical Blindspots in Theory and Model Building

The Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT) raises interesting questions concerning the link between emotion like appraisals of conspiracy beliefs, on the one hand, and related action tendencies, on the other. The model, however, also presents visible “theoretical blindspots” that do not allow researchers to see through, and unambiguously follow, the unfolding of psychological processes related to the appraisal of those conspiracy beliefs, resulting emotions, and associated action tendencies. From our current perspective, blindspots are defined as limitations that make the formulation of predictions unclear and ambiguous, obstacles that hide (and thereby impede to notice and address) crucial aspects in the functioning of a theory or model. They may be due to unexamined assumptions, lack of interdisciplinary integration, underspecification of processes and variables, or the multifacetedness of certain manifestations and causal explanations. If overlooked, theoretical blindspots may severely obscure the understanding of phenomena, and our ability to make predictions. In the following, we will concentrate on some theoretical blindspots which, in our view, affect the current version of the AMCT.