Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective intentionality and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
Articolo
Data di Pubblicazione:
2011
Abstract:
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I will present a taxonomy of collective, inter-subjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality.
The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, inter-subjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and inter-subjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality—practical, affective and cognitive—which have to be distinguished
The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term «sharing», a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of inter-subjective and social intentionality.
Finally I shall point out hat inter-subjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.
In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I will present a taxonomy of collective, inter-subjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality.
The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, inter-subjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and inter-subjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality—practical, affective and cognitive—which have to be distinguished
The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term «sharing», a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of inter-subjective and social intentionality.
Finally I shall point out hat inter-subjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.
Tipologia CRIS:
1.1 Articolo in rivista
Keywords:
collective intentionality; social intentionality; inter-subjective intentionality; social cognition; cognitive, practical and affective intentionality; shared intentionality
Elenco autori:
DE VECCHI, FRANCESCA MARIA
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