The normative bond between Kantian autonomy and Sartrean authenticity: A critical existentialist perspective

Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little-known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non-ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate. 1 |